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Fault Lines:
Emerging Domains of Inertia within the Australian Wine Industry
David Aylward
Abstract
It is common knowledge that the Australian wine industry has enjoyed remarkable
success over the past three decades in terms of production and export growth,
innovation and reputation for consistent quality. The centralization of resources and
infrastructure, as well as the nationally-oriented funding and R&D agendas are
usually cited as providing the foundation for this success.
Yet in more recent years it is this same nationally-focused centralization that is
increasingly at odds with a rapidly changing international wine landscape and
therefore, the organizational and innovation requirements of the firms that must
respond to these changes.
This paper explores these issues within the theoretical context of what it has termed
domain inertia – an industry-level dislocation between oganization and firm
imperatives. Arguing that neither traditional organizational or innovation-based
change theories deal with the complexities of industry-level inertia the paper attempts
to move beyond orthodox theoretical parameters. In so doing, it adopts a somewhat
unique theory that places organizational and innovation inertia within a widening
domain of discordant industry-level imperatives.
Key words: Wine industry, domain inertia, innovation, organizational, firm.
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Fault Lines:
Emerging Domains of Inertia within the Australian Wine Industry
David Aylward
In 2006, the Australian wine industry has approximately 2000 participating firms,
with 166,000 hectares under vine, and demonstrates extraordinary growth rates in
industry participants and product volume. It is a leading exporter, dominating the
popular-premium price points in the world’s two largest wine markets - the UK and
the USA - as well as representing approximately 10% of the global wine trade.1
In terms of structure, the industry is populated by a very small number of large,
international firms and approximately 1,970 small and medium sized firms. These
firms are concentrated in a number of regions within four of Australia’s states – New
South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia and Victoria. The regions of South
Australia make up what is often referred to as the industry’s dominant wine cluster.2
Infrastructure and resource planning within the industry is highly centralised in
comparison to other New and Old World wine industries. The Grape and Wine
Research and Development Corporation (GWRDC) is at the ‘hub’ of this structure as
the intermediary body that collects R&D levies, matches these levies with government
funding, determines R&D priorities, resource allocation, and industry vision. In
addition, there is the Australian Wine Research Institute (AWRI), which conducts the
majority of the industry’s research, the Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation
(AWBC), which controls information, promotes and regulates the industry, and the
Winemakers’ Federation of Australia (WFA), which supports the industry on strategic
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and promotional issues.3 These, together with other national wine organisations,
represent the public sector side of the industry and are all located within the South
Australian wine cluster.4 The industry’s centralisation was a key component in its
transition from cottage industry status to a leading producer and exporter. Over the
past two decades the industry has also been used as a template of innovation and
knowledge diffusion for other New World wine industries. To the casual observer it is
a model industry that displays dynamic organisational characteristics.5
Yet a more intimate examination reveals what may be emerging as ‘fault lines’ within
the industry. These fault lines refer to a growing gap in imperatives between the major
regional wine clusters and the industry level organisations that service them. In terms
of regional identity, branding support, R&D extension and decision-making, the gap
in priorities, strategies and even expectations appears to be widening. Such fault lines
reflect an operational and conceptual void at the industry level, which this paper will
argue is, in fact, a void represented by a hybrid of structural, innovative and
behavioural inertia. This hybrid will be referred to as domain inertia.
Traditional Interpretations of Inertia
Depending on the field there are many and varied interpretations of inertia.
Furthermore, confining these interpretations to organisational or innovation theory
alone does not offer significant clarity. Even within these fields there is still a myriad
of variations, models and in some cases contradictions.
One of the more pronounced theories is that offered by Hannan, Polos and Carroll6
who, building on Hannan’s and Freeman’s7 original model, define inertia as “a
persistent organizational resistance to changing architecture”. It is argued that
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structural and architectural inertia have deterministic qualities; that they emerge
through a Darwinian type of natural selection and that the longer the organization
survives, the more static it inherently becomes.8 Hannan and Freeman’s sympathy
towards this inertial paradigm is evidenced by another of their definitions, which
states that inertia is “the inverse of the hazard of initiating change”.9
Such sympathy is common among population ecologists, who tend to view shorter-
term inertia as preferable to structural and architectural change. They contend that by
maintaining an approximate status quo, organisations do not expose themselves to
abrupt variations or directional change and thereby reduce the risk of mortality.10 This
also fits within the Hannan and Freeman11 ‘reliable action’ model, where an
organization acting reliably will provide prompt, quality service and products with
appropriate accountability. Reliability and accountability, they contend, require
structures that can be replicated easily and cost-effectively, a type of standardisation
which, of course, requires conservative action, or resistance to change.12
The argument deriving from these two viewpoints is that inertia maintains
organisational linkages, internal dynamics, hierarchical and operational legitimacy, as
well as structural arrangements that have evolved over time. To apply substantial
internal or external pressure to any one of these factors will set the organisation on an
uncertain path, increasing risk of failure and perhaps subjecting it to a terminal course
of action.13 Institutional theorists such as Greenwood & Hinings14 also follow this
reasoning, but with perhaps more insight into potential external influences. Their
argument is that the institutional environment, with its social, cultural and business
‘norms’, applies an architectural ‘straightjacket’ to the average organization. To break
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from such a straightjacket is to expose the organisation to cultural isolation or ‘ex-
communication’, again increasing the risk of mortality. This reasoning also flows into
the concept of innovation lock-in, which will be expanded upon later in the paper.15
DiMaggio and Powell16 add a further degree of complexity to traditional adaptation
theories. They contend that highly structured organisations necessarily provide a
context within which efforts to deal in a rational way with uncertainty lead to greater
uniformity. Once organizations are structured through competitive market or state
forces, there are rules by which they must abide. The most important of these is
‘rationality’ of decision making, a value which is created by the environment within
which the organization must operate and one that inevitably encourages homogeneity
as the organizational environment evolves. Importantly for this paper, DiMaggio and
Powell divide this homogeneity, or what they have termed ‘isomorphism’, into
competitive and institutional arenas. Both, however, adhere to the same inertial
paradigm that follows from Hannan and Freeman’s original thesis.
Theorists less sympathetic to this thesis include Brown17 and Genschel18, among
others. Brown19 argues that a lack of change is equally detrimental to an organization
and that inertia, therefore, can and does create significant liability. Conservative
action in the face of change may indeed protect the organization in the short-term, but
by not implementing the change required to compete within new and changing
environments exposes it to pressures it is unable to withstand. It can no longer
compete in a new environment for which it is not equipped. On the flip-side, Brown20
contends that when an organisation makes a radical and successful change, others
tend to follow and over time institutionalise that change. This not only creates clear
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pathways for future change but helps to eliminate resistance to that change. In such
cases a new ‘legitimacy’ is established.
Genschel21 perhaps offers a more sophisticated alternative to the new institutionalism
literature by disputing the parallel between ‘inertia’ and stasis. By equating inertia
with ‘no change’ there is an over-simplification of the term. Instead, Genschel22
contends that inertia can either represent a static state or in fact, can be the trigger for
new and innovative pathways. This trigger is not an obvious reference to
environmental shock, but rather, to the extension and supplementation of existing
structures in a manner more profound and nuanced than simple ‘adaptation’. In fact,
Genschel23 goes so far as to claim that inertia is often a pre-requisite for change.
The point that institutionalists appear to have neglected is that when the correlation
between environmental risk and risk aversion peaks, as the result of, and resulting in,
a maximum level of inertia, this is precisely the moment when change is optimal.
Their argument that inertia is an advantage in the short term through its protection of
sunk costs and avoidance of transition problems may have some validity. However,
as Genschel24 states, “The avoidance of disruptions in the near future may lock actors
into developmental pathways which lead into dead ends, and thus cause disruptions in
the distant future”. More than this, for an organisation to favour inertia at a time when
its industry sector may be experiencing radical change is to ensure a clash of
operating paradigms. If, for example, a global industry requires a product, marketing
or distribution type that a particular organisation can no longer deliver due to a
discordance in operating environments, then that organisation will cease to be
commercially relevant to the industry.
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The Innovation Perspective of Inertia
Deriving from the organizational framework is the innovation-based theory of inertia.
Due to what Anderson (2004) refers to as the co-evolution of technology, institutions
and organizations, with institutions providing the ‘background conditioning’ for
innovation, the emergence of inertia within this domain is almost pre-determined.25
As industry participants follow conservative organizational pathways in order to limit
various forms of risk, their structural, behavioural and innovative frameworks will
necessarily imitate this conservatism. In innovation terms, this is referred to as lock-in
or path dependency. Firms, institutions, organizations and entire industry sectors can
be prone to a condition whereby previous innovation success, an institutional
‘thickness’ and a strict co-location of requisite infrastructure can result in isolationist
tendencies. Such a condition is most apparent in mature industry clusters that have
become independent of their industry sector, self-sustained and thus prone to
innovation lock-in.26 The more historically successful the cluster and the more
pronounced its operational pathways, the more risk-averse its frameworks and the
more likely the legacy of innovation lock-in. This paper will argue that such
innovation lock-in at the industry level is a legacy of a dislocation between industry
organizations and firm priorities and as such, presents paradigmatic shifts more
complex than those operating at a simple organization or firm level.
Alternative theoretical frameworks
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DiMaggio and Powell27 state that “… the full power of the institutional perspective
has yet to be realized, due in part to ambiguities in some of the initial contributions . .
. and to the fact that a somewhat stylized version of institutional theory – a restricted
institutionalism – has thus far been explicated”. It is this ‘restriction’ that has
established relatively orthodox parameters within which alternative theories must
reside and compete for legitimacy.
In order to pursue robust analysis within rapidly changing industry sectors such as the
wine industry, however, we need to think outside these orthodox parameters. For
example, in current institutional change literature there is little that addresses the way
in which risk aversion is determined, at what stage it applies or the way its success or
failure is influenced by the organisational history.
If Hannan and Freeman’s28 theory on risk aversion is applied to the Australian wine
industry over the last 25 years the outcome is one of strong contradiction. This wine
industry has been in existence since the 1850s and by the late twentieth century had
created a considerable organisational legacy. In the late 1980s, however, stakeholders
from state and federal government, research agencies, training institutes, supplier
groups and the wine firms themselves came together in a bold and very much untried
attempt to overhaul the industry. This they did in what has become a virtual template
for New World wine industries. Funding, research, extension, marketing, distribution
and international trade were largely centralised in accord with ambitious medium and
long-term strategies.29
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It was one of the most dramatic restructures in Australia’s industrial history and it was
a resounding success. Within a decade, the Australian wine industry had been
transformed from a largely domestic cottage industry into a serious global
competitor.30 As it continued to gain market share from Old World industries such as
France, Italy and Spain, so its reputation for innovation, product quality, consistency
and value was confirmed. This remarkable transformation was orchestrated by a core
group of individuals with a clear vision and a determination to align the industry with
the rapidly changing international landscape.31 The point to be made here is that the
Australian wine industry not only overcame entrenched interests to implement radical
change, but this change did not increase the chances of mortality. In fact, it did the
opposite. Another critical issue was that of risk assessment. In determining the degree
of risk associated with such changes, potential damage to the industry’s already
mediocre status was weighed against the potential benefits of locking into global
pipelines of trade, technology transfer and distribution. In short, there was little to
lose.
A French example
A further example of radical change within organisational and innovation domains is
currently unfolding within the beleaguered French wine industry. While similar risk
assessment decisions are being applied in this situation, the stakes are possibly much
higher. As has been well documented, the French wine industry has been suffering
over the past decade in large part due to competitive pressures from the New World.
Exports have fallen dramatically, as has its market share in the USA and UK. It has
been accused of being overly regulatory, overly subsidised, arrogant in its refusal to
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adopt New World innovation, and hostage to producer-driven demands.32 There is
truth in these accusations.
In the face of such challenges the French wine industry has, until recently, refused to
acknowledge that the rise of the New World was anything more than an aberration. It
remained locked into its traditional wine making practices, its disparate and largely
inefficient distribution channels, its parochial interpretation of terroir, and its often
outdated viticultural management.33 Resistance to change has only served to reinforce
the industry’s relative decline. The New World had been offering exciting, consumer-
driven varieties, consistency, technical quality and value while French tradition had
lost its appeal to a new class of value-conscious consumer.
Since the turn of the century, however, a group of innovative winemakers in
Bordeaux has successfully begun to ‘invert’ or roll back this inertia within both
organization and innovation domains. The success of this group, known as garagistas
(due to their small, garage style wine-making facilities), can be attributed to their
artful blending of New and Old World techniques.34 Its small but technically
sophisticated facilities use the best of New World innovation while rejecting its
approach of mass production and standardization. Instead, they retain the custom of
Bordeaux’s ‘Left Bank’ chateaux in limiting yields, hand harvesting, hand-sorting and
optimising grape quality. As a result, the group is producing what are arguably the
best wines in the world, and in so doing has reignited France’s reputation for quality
and through example, revolutionized French oenological and viticultural innovation.35
Indeed, it is difficult to over-estimate the level of organizational change and
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innovation these garagistas have brought about in the Bordeaux, and in fact, the
entire French wine industry.
Inertia in the Australian wine industry
In 2006 the story of inertia in the Australian wine industry is different again. The
industry has experienced thirty years of evolution since the last major forms of
domain inertia were apparent. In addition, the internal dynamics of the Australian
industry are quite antithetical to those of the French. It is highly centralised as
opposed to fragmented, it has coordinated funding of R&D, attracts no government
subsidy, has distinct geographical clusters and has far fewer producers.36
Because of its centralisation of infrastructure and R&D it requires a somewhat unique
theoretical model. While theoretical underpinning of change at the firm and
institutional level have become increasingly intimate over the past decade, there is
little attempt to adapt these models to the broader industry-level environment.37
Another more subtle weakness is the lack of articulation between organizational and
innovation frameworks. Instead, there is sometimes a rather crude extrapolation of
existing theories that lack the subtlety and complexity required by these different
paradigms.
Yet if we are to extend our understanding beyond the orthodoxy of current inertia
theories we must acknowledge alternative paradigms. The data presented in this paper
reflect one such paradigm, that is, the increasing dislocation of imperatives within the
Australian wine industry in recent years. The dislocation has been created by
diverging pathways of two distinct stakeholder groups – the wine firms and the
12
industry-level organisations by which those firms are serviced. After the radical
changes brought about in the late 1980s, the industry emerged as a unified entity with
closely interwoven relationships and most importantly, common goals. This paper
will argue, however, that the situation has since devolved into a multi-goal
environment of mixed and often conflicting priorities.38
Understanding a changing global landscape
Since 2000, the industry’s landscape has been subjected to seismic shifts – global
shifts in demand, supply, ownership, distribution, markets, price points and product
style. Such shifts have created both strategic and operational pressures. They have
also brought about a restructuring of the wine landscape in response to these
pressures, in turn creating multiple nexi of local production with global pipelines of
distribution and technology transfer.
Another dimension of the new landscape is the substantial rationalisation now taking
place in the industry. In the Australian wine scene, as is the case internationally,
mergers and acquisitions among and by the larger firms have created a truly global
culture. For example, approximately 55% of Australian wine sales flow back to
foreign interests. Two of Australia’s four largest wine firms export their profits to
headquarters located outside Australia.39 In turn, the larger of the country’s wine
firms have substantial interests in other New and Old world wine industries. Such
global ownership suggests that traditional national boundaries and approaches are
rather limited. Furthermore, as wine consumers become more educated, the demand
for products with a history and a story to tell - wines that differentiate themselves by
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terroir, style and heritage - have reinforced the trend toward local/regional identities,
again invalidating the national approach.
A new theory for a new paradigm
This is where a distinction between the two sets of industry stakeholders becomes
apparent. Industry organisations such as the GWRDC, the AWBC and the WFA have
built their entire platform on the 1995 ‘2025 vision’. This original article of policy
and operation was focused on growing Australia’s exports in quantity and quality
through national extension of research and development and a nationally branded
product. It was implemented in a period of embryonic internationalisation for the
industry and has become a mandate for these organisations. Their vision and ability to
react to changing environments is governed by a mantle of generic, national priorities.
As such, they continue to service the entire industry from a common set of resources
for a common purpose – that of ‘Brand Australia’.
The extent to which these organisations fulfil their objectives is not in question. In
fact they consistently achieve or surpass their own benchmarks. What is in question
are the objectives themselves. While an eleven year-old, ‘pre-fabricated’ mandate
provides rigid parameters within which the industry organisations operate, the firms
which they service (the other stakeholders) are responding to altogether different
mandates. These are contemporary and are determined by consumer demand, higher
price points, flexible distribution channels and consumer pressure for regional
differentiation. In short, Australian wine firms are increasingly operating within the
rules of a fundamentally different paradigm. They are exposed to the pressures of
international price competition, are under pressure to build sustainable and
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identifiable brands within a fickle marketplace, and must retain a technological edge
over both New and Old World rivals. A non-adaptive, one-size-fits-all approach,
therefore, is rapidly losing value. It is these two mismatched paradigms of operation
that are creating industry level inertia in both organisational and innovation domains.40
Unlike models of inertia within the more orthodox literature, this model cannot be
neatly ascribed to an individual entity or even group of entities. Rather, it is an
industry-level model which represents a conceptual and operational void between
discordant imperatives. Industry organisations are adapting and even changing in
response to perceived challenges at a national level. As mentioned, they are often
exceeding their own operational benchmarks in this response. The wine firms are also
adapting and changing in response to their multi-faceted challenges, but these
challenges are occurring across a landscape that no longer follows the contours of that
already mapped out by the organisations. Instead it is a landscape where global
requirements dock directly within regional ports.
One telling example of such difference is obvious in the current debate over the
industry’s marketing campaign. In 2005 the industry organisations, led by the WFA,
the Australian Wine Export Council (AWEC) and the AWBC implemented a ‘new’
marketing campaign for Australian wine.41 The initiative emerged as a result of
increased global pressures on price-points, consolidating distribution channels and a
educated consumer, looking for something more than a consistent, pleasant, but
ultimately bland and blended product. As data will show, from the firms’ perspective
the response was disappointing. Retaining the ‘national’ agenda, the industry
organisations repackaged their 1995 campaign. Under the 11 year-old marketing label
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of ‘Brand Australia’, international consumers were now told to “Open their Mind to
Australian Wine’. This apparent nuance was intended to reflect the increasing
diversity of Australia’s wine brands. According to the wine firms themselves (current
survey), however, it has done little to reflect the push into higher price points by
boutique and small wineries, the regional focus of single vineyard or estate wines or
the trend towards non-blended heritage wines.
The campaign’s primary target remains the popular-premium price points in the UK
and US markets. Unlike other leading wine industries, there is little if any
acknowledgment of the ‘reputation-making’ wines distributed in the ultra-premium
and icon market points.42 There is no individual promotion of world-class regions that
dot each of Australia’s winemaking states. There are no ‘stories’ being told, no
heritage being created and hence, no rivals for the famous châteaux of Bordeaux.43
The emergent and unprecedented needs of Australia’s wine firms in making the
conceptual ‘leap’ to fine wine production is being met with an industry response that
depends upon enshrined precedents. The void between expectations and ‘solutions’ is
instilling a form of inertia that transcends traditional organisational and innovation
boundaries.
The findings from the current study will follow.
Method
This study has been based on findings from a number of the author’s previous studies.
In this context, it was designed to examine the relationship between wine firm
priorities and those of the industry organisations in terms of product branding,
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regionalisation and R&D extension. The hypothesis underpinning this examination
argues that there is a growing discord between such priorities. It is one which relates
directly to stakeholder mandates and it is creating a new form of inertia at the industry
level. There has been an attempt in the article, therefore, to adapt current theoretical
frameworks within organisational change literature to reflect more accurately the
conceptual and structural inertia at an industry rather than organisational level.
The current study was divided into two main sections. The first section dealt with
issues of regional branding, its importance to firm operations, support from industry
organisations, and the correlation between regionalisation and product differentiation.
The second section focused on the industry’s R&D extension (innovation) and the
degree to which it supports regionalisation. As part of this, the role and effectiveness
of the GWRDC, the AWRI and regional research nodes are all addressed by the
study’s user survey.
Wine firms, as the primary users of the industry’s services were first surveyed. The
survey sample included 165 wine SMEs. A randomised, stratified methodology was
chosen for this sampling. The survey was restricted to SMEs and care was taken to
ensure a similar number of firms from each of the four chosen states – New South
Wales, South Australia, Western Australia and Victoria – were captured. In addition,
only exporting firms were included in the study and again, care was taken to include
representation from the diverse regions within each state. In each case, either the CEO
or production manager was the respondent. Surveys were conducted by phone, so a
high response rate of approximately 75% was achieved. In addition to the survey
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instrument, in-depth interviews were carried out with four of the governing industry
organisations to gauge their perceptions and actions on the same issues.
Findings
The question of regional identity
The transcendent, ‘industry-level’ inertia embedded within this paper’s theoretical
foundation is demonstrated clearly throughout the findings. In particular, the regional
as opposed to national struggle for brand recognition highlights the inadequacy of
orthodox inertia theories in explaining what has become a unique inertial paradigm. In
sharp contrast to the industry organisations’ ‘national wine agenda’, there was
overwhelming support among the 165 survey firms for a focus on regional and local
identity. Overall, 91% (148) believed that this identity was either critical or very
important to their marketing and operational success, as well as to their product’s
reputation. Despite the regional promotion rhetoric in recent media releases, it appears
that the gap between firm imperatives and those of the industry organisations is
growing.44 Although 91% of firms believed strongly in the importance of regional
identity, only 33% believed the industry organisations placed any importance on such
identity. This feeling was of course most obvious in the geographically isolated
regions of Western Australia, where only 23% of firms believed the central industry
organisations were servicing their interests.
One of the main thrusts in the call for regional and local identity is the pressure to
create a point-of-difference in product and marketing – a major firm imperative. As
indicated previously, global distributors and consumers are becoming more
sophisticated in looking beyond the Australian guarantee of consistency and value for
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money. There is pressure to produce and market wines with individual stories,
heritage and a legitimate claim on terroir. In terms of sustainability it is also critical
for the Australian industry to discard its reputation for bland ‘industrial’ wine by
targeting higher price points with low-yield, high-quality products that are
individually crafted.45 This ‘point-of-difference’ in product and marketing is
antithetical to the generic ‘Brand Australia’ approach being adhered to by the industry
organisations. Yet the wine firms themselves see the differentiation as critical to their
future. Of the 164 firms responding to this question, 87% claimed that such
differentiation was integral to their sustained competitiveness. They also believed it
was integral to the industry’s sustainability and further, that it was inextricably linked
to regional and local identity.
Branding
The issue was further pursued with specific questions about firm views on ‘Brand
Australia’ and its appropriateness as a global marketing vehicle. Responses only
served to reinforce the mismatch between the national agenda and regional
imperatives. Of the firms responding to these questions 73% disagreed with the
campaign, claiming that it was dated, was too generic, and that it even undermined
their ability to leverage their own brands. They argued that it failed to address and
respond to a rapidly changing landscape of consumer sentiment and escalating
distribution points. Lockshin46 puts it bluntly in stating that there is “…no established
policy to develop a regional or terroir-based promotion for Australia, especially as
compared to competitors”. This failure tended to lock Australian wine into a pre-
determined product category with which many producers were becoming increasingly
uncomfortable.
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Instead, through the survey and other fora, firms have been consistently calling for an
extension of ‘Brand Australia’ to incorporate region-specific branding. They are not
advocating the dismantling of ‘Brand Australia’, but rather, suggesting that it be
adapted to incorporate the unique characteristics, terroirs and products of Australia’s
more notable regions. They argue that it is about building regional recognition and
reputation as part of the Australian advantage. Only this way can the industry build
brands at the higher price points to compete with the chateaux of Bordeaux as well as
the famous estates of Napa, Sonoma and New Zealand’s Marlborough region.47 As
James Halliday succinctly put it, “Australia, unlike France, is limited by the lack of
well-known Australian regions”.48 Kym Anderson49 reinforces this sentiment when he
states that “…regional branding will add to Brand Australia as an additional and more
specific means of ... promotion”.
Extension of R&D versus Innovation Lock-in
Firms within the survey claim that the national campaign in its current format also has
wider implications. Primary among these is the industry’s extension of research and
development (R&D). Mandated under the articles of the GWRDC, the industry’s
R&D is formulated along generic, national guidelines and extended in the same
manner. These guidelines are dictated by the most common need, the ability to
undertake the research and greatest return in outcomes.50 In short, it runs parallel with
the industry’s generic marketing strategy, and in fact, serves to underline it. The focus
is primarily on national viticultural and oenological management in the pursuit of a
product that is disease free, is of consistent quality, is technically good, is blended
from multiple regions, represents value for money, is fruit-driven and of instant, age-
free appeal. Such a product fits comfortably within the popular-premium price points
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that Australia currently dominates and, according to the industry bodies, represents
the best return financially (although much of that money is returned to overseas
interests).
It does, however, return little in the way of reputation for fine, high quality wine. The
perception of surveyed firms within this and other studies is that such generic R&D,
which utilises the vast majority of industry resources, actually creates a climate of
innovation lock-in, whereby R&D is limited by the cultural environment. This
establishes barriers to new, innovative R&D pathways and serves to undermine the
tenet of differentiation.51 They believe that in order to create differentiated products,
differentiated R&D is essential. Again, there is an increasing gap in innovation
objectives between the industry’s organisations and the firms which they service.
Whether it be canopy management, disease control, soil analysis, irrigation, pest
management or rootstock development, firms argue that these are region-specific
problems requiring region-specific solutions. Instead, ‘solutions’ tend to be dictated
from Adelaide (GWRDC Headquarters) in a pre-fabricated format that often fails to
address individual concerns but does reflect classical lock-in characteristics.52
Extension tends to be sporadic and incomplete, with a severe shortage of trained field
officers or adequate programs. As a result, firm participation is low and often
concentrated among the larger operators.
Despite the fact that appropriate R&D extension is viewed by operators as a pre-
requisite to the creation of regionally branded networks and as an indicator of the
industry’s research breadth, only 21% believed that the industry organisations were
serious about it. As one firm CEO stated, “There needs to be more industry
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consultation prior to setting agendas, from everyone, not just the big boys”. This
sentiment is reinforced by innovation theorists such as Boschma53, who argues that
there is substantial risk of institutional lock-in when policy reflects the interests of the
dominant players rather than an open system where strategic policy is directed by new
players and economic renewal. It appears that the sentiment was also fairly uniform
among firms, with widespread calls for decentralisation. Currently, the AWRI, which
conducts the vast majority of the industry’s research, is based wholly in Adelaide, at
the heart of the South Australian wine cluster. This centralisation of research of
course underscores the generic, one-size-fits-all approach and perpetuates the
discordant imperatives between organisations and firms. It also fits neatly within Lee
et al.’s54 ‘exploitation’ model, where the orthodox technological framework is
retained at the expense of a possibly more compatible, but exploratory one.
A large majority of firms (70% of those surveyed) suggest that a more appropriate
research structure would be one in which the AWRI hub remained at Adelaide in the
dominant wine cluster, but with appropriately funded and resourced ‘nodes’ within
each of the country’s other major wine regions. Such a structure would allow firms in
individual regions or clusters to tap into their respective node. Research within each
node would be region-specific. This would also underline that region’s marketing and
distribution campaign and thereby extend the national agenda to create a more
differentiated environment. It would also disrupt the current path dependency of
nationally-oriented innovation networks. In fact, 76% of the surveyed firms believe
participation in these ‘regional clusters’ was critical to their competitive advantage.
As well as differentiation, there would be representation. It would be expected that
regional nodes would enhance the participation in decision making throughout the
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industry, as greater interaction would encourage access and opportunity among the
industry’s smaller firms. This would create a sharp contrast to the current centralised
structure where 90% of boutique, small and medium firms in the survey believe that
they are disenfranchised from the decision making process.
Policy paralysis
Representatives from industry organisations were also asked to comment on this
‘research node’ model. Their reactions were mixed. Two of the four representatives
were in favour of the model, agreeing that it would be more efficient in the extension
of research and would help underpin the international move towards regional
promotion. One pointed out that this model was already evolving in Chile and
Argentina and had become established in New Zealand. Both, however, admitted that
their organisations would be unable to pursue such a model. For the first, it lay
outside the organisation’s terms of reference and in the case of the second, its
mandate prohibited such decentralisation.
The other two representatives argued against the model, relying on the historical
success with a generic approach to support their argument. They claimed, correctly,
that the national model of R&D extension that had supported the industry for the past
twenty-five years had become a benchmark among most New World industries. Their
generic model supported the popular premium price-points where the majority of
business remained for Australia. This is also true, but as was pointed out to the two
representatives, the majority of business is also conducted by the four largest wine
firms, two of which are owned by overseas interests. Therefore, the Australian
industry is actually getting a poor return on its investment in this sector.
23
But there is a far more important issue to be considered. Supporting regional R&D
extension is about supporting many operators who sell into the higher super-premium
and icon price points. While these price points represent a far smaller percentage of
the overall market, it is the sector, as Brian Croser55 argues, in which reputations are
made. It is a reputation which serves not only the individual firm or even the region,
but the entire industry.56 Industries that dominate these price points are recognised as
producing high-quality, ‘luxury’ brands.57 (Brook, 2000).
A perfect example of this ‘reputation-making’ strategy is France’s Bordeaux. This
region is known internationally as producing the world’s finest wine. While many
consumers buy Australian, Californian or South African wine for daily occasions,
these same consumers will usually turn to a Bordeaux wine when something special is
to be celebrated. The irony is that of Bordeaux’s 20,000 producers, less than 60 are
AOC classified and produce wines in the super-premium or icon price points. The
other 19,940 producers create often mediocre products that sell in the popular-
premium and bulk wine price points (ie between $2-$14 per litre). It is these 60
producers, however, that have given Bordeaux and France their fine wine
reputations.58 Yet convincing our industry organisations of the merit in the strategy
remains difficult.59 Their simple response when confronted with this argument was
that their organisations were mandated to continue with the current model and
although there were alternatives, they would not be considered at this stage.
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Concluding Remarks
Of course these mandates also tend to create their own legacies. Once rigid
parameters are established and legislated the ‘isomorphism’ of DiMaggio and Powel60
becomes apparent. At the industry level, however, with multiple stakeholders
responding to discordant organisational and technological pressures, the resulting
domain inertia is more pervasive and the paralysis more extensive. There is a
distinctive ‘sanctity’ applied to each group’s position. For example, firms within the
survey are quite obviously committed to the concept of a changing paradigm, where
production, distribution, marketing and the underlying R&D are driven at the regional
level to align more effectively with fluctuating global pressures. Commercial
imperatives have created a particular domain within which these firms must operate to
survive and prosper. To discard such a strategy would be to lose any competitive
advantage.
These imperatives, however, have not proved transferable to the industry’s other
major stakeholders – the organisations that service these firms. Although part of the
same industry, these organisations operate within a conceptually different landscape,
adhering to different cultural norms, with different benchmarks and different goals.
The firms are focused on recognition and return for themselves and their region. The
organisations are focused on recognition and return for the entire national industry. As
a result, expectations by one group are not satisfied by delivery from the other. It is
the void between this expectation and delivery within the industry sector that requires
a domain-level approach to change and inertia. Only through such an approach will
the complexities of a multi-goal landscape and the flux of its shifting paradigms be
fully captured.
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